Explore the dangers of relying on unqualified expertise on Iran in Washington. Learn how distorted evidence, the crisis framework, and the idea of inherent dishonesty contribute to misguided policies and hinder a nuanced understanding of Iran. Discover the need for a higher standard of expertise to challenge problematic tropes and push for a fact-based approach to foreign policy decisions.
This guest post is by Atilla Can Ekici. Atilla completed his master's degree at Birkbeck, University of London in 2020. He continues his doctoral education at the University of Plymouth, which he started in 2021 under the guidance of Dr Patrick Holden. His main areas of work are Saudi Arabia, Iran, foreign aid, and the Middle East.
When it comes to making foreign policy decisions, expertise is critical. It is essential to have knowledgeable individuals and groups that can provide accurate and nuanced information about other countries and regions. This is especially true when it comes to Iran, a country that has been the focus of much attention and debate in Washington in recent years.
However, relying on unqualified expertise on Iran can be dangerous. The consequences of such reliance can be significant and far-reaching. In this post, we will explore the dangers of unqualified expertise on Iran in Washington.
Iran expertise in Washington
In her 2019 article for Jadaliyya, Negar Razavi delves into the systemic problem of "Iran expertise" in Washington, which she argues has contributed to the dangerous and erratic policies toward Iran under the Trump administration. Despite the well-known desire for regime change by Trump's national security advisor, John Bolton, Razavi argues that the issue is much deeper than just one individual. She asserts that the wider system of knowledge production in Washington has consistently rewarded ungrounded, ideologically driven assessments of the Islamic Republic, often at the expense of qualified, in-depth, and evidence-based analysis.
Drawing on her own experience working for a major foreign policy think tank and conducting ethnographic fieldwork in DC, Razavi sheds light on the culture of expert impunity that has contributed to the unstable policies toward Iran we see today. While the article was written in 2019, its findings remain relevant today.
Distorting evidence
Negar Razavi's research on "Iran expertise" in the American foreign policy community reveals a disturbing pattern of abuse, particularly among those who advocate for regime change or confrontation with Iran. These individuals often distort or oversimplify evidence to support their ideological agendas against the Islamic Republic.
However, the problem is not limited to the hawks, as many liberal actors who favour diplomatic engagement with Iran also lack an understanding of the country's complexities. Despite this, US government officials often rely on a cadre of analysts with mixed credentials to shape their policies toward Iran.
Many of these so-called "Iran experts" lack Persian language skills and have never set foot in Iran. Razavi says: ”One research assistant working at a prominent think tank told me how, as someone who reads Arabic, he would read Persian language news articles aloud for another research assistant who could only speak (but not read) Persian. The two of them together would “translate” Iranian news articles for his boss, an expert who works on the Middle East and comments on Iran frequently. Regardless of their background or training, these experts have been called upon by US government officials, the media, and different interest groups to testify as analysts on nearly all aspects of Iran: from its complex governmental structure to its regional policies, oil production capabilities, nuclear technology, modern history, social dynamics, and the intricacies of Shi‘i jurisprudence.”
Those who do offer nuanced assessments of the country are often ignored in favour of those who offer simplified and often inaccurate portrayals. The result is a distorted understanding of Iran that has serious implications for US foreign policy.
The crisis framework
Another article by Razavi discusses how the U.S. foreign policy establishment justifies security interventions in the Middle East using the concept of 'crisis', which has become a dominant framework. This framework emerged due to the demands of the post-9/11 security state and the influence of think tank experts in Washington DC.
Through fieldwork among foreign policy elites, Razavi shows how these experts became a credible source of expertise for the U.S. government. She also examines why the crisis framing has become central to their work and how market-driven forces have impacted the U.S. counterterror state.
Policymakers also tend to select experts who can synthesise information in a simple, easily digestible way and reinforce their own policy positions publicly. The historical and contemporary grievances against Iran, the role of anti-Iranian foreign governments and interest groups in DC, and a lack of nuance and complexity in expert analysis exacerbate the problem.
Also, the relationship between academic scholarship and the US government is complex and contradictory. While academic fields like Middle East studies can provide a deeper analysis of countries like Iran, they have become critical of serving US interests abroad. Despite cuts to social sciences and humanities funding, many individual departments and scholars still seek out government funding and relationships with policymakers to demonstrate their relevance.
However, policy elites in Washington often dismiss academic scholars as irrelevant or hostile to US interests in the Middle East and claim they cannot be trusted as advisors on policy. This exclusion of critical academic voices has had dire consequences, such as in the 2003 war in Iraq where scholars who warned against invasion were actively dismissed.
The idea of inherent dishonesty
According to Razavi the claim that Iran's leaders are inherently dishonest is a widely circulated yet deeply problematic idea in Washington. Experts on Iran, particularly on the right, point to the Shi‘i concept of taqiyya to support this claim, rather than considering the historical and theological context of the practice or the inherent racism of the accusation.
According to Razavi, the claim that Iran's leaders are inherently dishonest is a widely circulated but highly problematic idea in Washington. Razavi cites Michael Rubin's article called "Can a Nuclear Iran Be Contained or Deterred?" and says Iran experts, especially on the right, point to the concept of Shiite taqiyya to support this claim, rather than considering the historical and theological context of the practice or the racism at the core of the accusation. Those who supported negotiations with Iran in 2015 ceded this point to their opponents.
This expert consensus on the dishonesty of Iran's leaders was used by the Trump administration to reject the internationally negotiated nuclear deal with Iran. A higher standard of expertise on Iran is needed to challenge these problematic tropes and assessments about Iran and to push for a new system where facts are checked, and accusations are corroborated with evidence.
Conclusion
Razavi ends her article with this: "The claim that Iran's leaders are inherently dishonest is a widely circulated yet deeply problematic idea in Washington. Experts on Iran, particularly on the right, point to the Shi‘i concept of taqiyya to support this claim, rather than considering the historical and theological context of the practice or the inherent racism of the accusation. Those who supported negotiations with Iran in 2015 ceded this point to their opponents.
This expert consensus on the dishonesty of Iran's leaders was used by the Trump administration to reject the internationally negotiated nuclear deal with Iran. A higher standard of expertise on Iran is needed to challenge these problematic tropes and assessments about Iran and to push for a new system where facts are checked, and accusations are corroborated with evidence."
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